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There is a shared dogma among contemporary ontologists that heavyweight quanti-
fication is unrestricted quantification. It was, I believe, David Lewis (1986) who in-
troduced the notion of unrestricted quantification into metaphysics to provide a con-
ciliatory account of the apparent discrepancy between his revisionary ontology and 
common sense ontology concerning mereological sums and concrete possibilia. There 
is no real conflict between the ontologist’s revisionary claims and common sense, 
because revisionary claims involve unrestricted quantification while common sense 
claims involve restricted quantification. 
This dogma is also reflected on the higher level of metaontology in Eli Hirsch’s 
(2002 and 2008) puzzling doctrine of quantifier variance. We are told, for instance, 
that in the ontological dispute about composition the universalist and the nihilist are 
both right. If it were just a matter of restricting the shared existential quantifier, the 
nihilist using restricted quantification where the universalist uses unrestricted quan-
tification, only the universalist would be right. So each is using an unrestricted 
quantifier, albeit a different one. 
 In this paper I will present an exclusion argument for heavyweight ontological 
realism based on the rejection of this dogma and outline a new conception of 
lightweight and heavyweight quantification. 
But first, some definition-mongering. David Chalmers (2009), from whom these 
terms are borrowed, characterizes heavyweight ontological realism as the 
combination of ontological realism and heavyweight quantificationism. Ontological 
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realism is the view that the world has ontological joints, or, as Chalmers (ibid: 92) 
says, that ontological existential assertions have objective and determinate truth-
values (ontological existential assertions are made in the philosophy room).  
 Heavyweight quantificationism is the view that ontological existential assertions 
always involve heavyweight quantification. Heavyweight quantification is contrasted 
with lightweight quantification. The truth-values of lightweight quantifications are 
always trivial or shallow somehow. They are a priori knowable, perhaps because they 
analytically or conceptually follow (e.g. ‘Numbers exist’ made in the math room). In 
opposition to that, the truth-values of heavyweight quantifications are never trivial or 
shallow in this way (‘Numbers exist’ made in the philosophy room). As Chalmers 
(ibid: 96) says, their truth-value depends on substantial philosophical considerations 
that go well beyond elementary reasoning. So heavyweight ontological realism is the 
view that ontological existential assertions have objective and determinate truth-
values that are never trivial or shallow. 
 Heavyweight realism has two rivals, ontological anti-realism and lightweight 
realism. Lightweight realism is based on the idea that ontological realism is com-
patible with ontological deflationism. Lightweight realists are deflationists about 
ontology. Ontological existential assertions have objective and determinate truth-
values, but their truth or falsity is always trivial or shallow, so are lightweight quan-
tifications. 
 Ontological anti-realism is the denial of ontological realism. Ontological 
antirealism is best illustrated by a picture of the world as an amorphous lump. In this 
picture the world has no objective ontological structure and has no ontological joints. 
So, if ontology is about carving at the joints, any ontology is as good as any other, for 
there is nothing for it to match. That is, no ontological existential assertion has an 
objective or determinate truth-value (a weaker version would be that not every one of 
them has an objective or determinate truth-value, but I focus on the ultra-strong 
version here). I distinguish three brands of ontological anti-realism along the way 
ontological existential assertions might fail to have objective and determinate truth-
value: noncognitivism, pluralism and indeterminism. Ontological noncognitivism 
denies that ontological existential assertions are truth-apt (I set this one aside). 
Ontological pluralism denies that ontological existential assertions have objective 
truth-values, hence there can be many different but equally good quantifier meanings, 
since there are no objective ontological facts out there in the world which any of them 
could fail to capture. Ontological indeterminism denies that ontological existential 
assertions have determinate truth-values, hence there can be many different but 
equally good precisifications of the vague quantifier, since there are no determinate 
ontological facts out there in the world which any of them could miss. 
 These characterizations make it apparent that quantifier variance lies at the heart 
of ontological pluralism and ontological indeterminism. Quantifier variance is the 
doctrine that (i) there are many candidate meanings (precisifications) for the 
quantifier expressions, and (ii) none of the candidate meanings (precisifications) is 
distinguished. There are arguments against both claims of quantifier variance. 
Promiscuity arguments, like Ted Sider’s (2001, 2003) indeterminacy argument or 
Matti Eklund’s (2007) tarskian argument, are directed against (i), and Sider’s (2009) 
naturalness argument targets (ii).  
 But are they arguments for heavyweight realism? Not quite. As I see it, 
promiscuity arguments are effective against anti-realism insofar as it involves quan-
tifier variance, but they only prove lightweight realism. The naturalness argument is 
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an argument for heavyweight realism, but is only effective against lightweight real-
ism, and so has limited use (for if the world has ontological joints, one can argue that 
among the many candidate meanings there is a single, most natural quantifier 
meaning that carves at the joints, but if the world is just an amorphous lump there 
cannot be a most natural meaning, I suppose). What’s more, the heavyweight realist 
cannot use both arguments, because promiscuity arguments seem to undermine the 
naturalness argument (see Liebesman-Eklund 2007). 
 Forget the naturalness argument and concentrate on promiscuity arguments! I 
think we can forge an argument for heavyweight realism based on them. I shall briefly 
present Sider’s indeterminacy argument and its counterpart against multiple candidate 
meanings.  
 Suppose it is indeterminate whether x.Fx, because the unrestricted quantifier  
is semantically vague (F is not vague). Let 1 and 2 be such precisifications of  that 
1x.Fx is determinately true and 2x.Fx is determinately false. Hence there is some 
object in 1’s domain that is not in 2’s domain. Thus 2 does not range over 
everything so it cannot be a precisification of . Thus  cannot have different preci-
sifications, since the most promiscuous of the supposed precisifications is the only 
one it can have. Which means that the quantifier meaning cannot be vague. But if the 
quantifier meaning cannot be vague, nor can the truth-value of ontological existential 
assertions be vague. Ontological indeterminism is false. 
 The same reasoning applies when 1 and 2 are possible meanings of . The most 
promiscuous candidate meaning will be the real quantifier meaning. Hence there must 
be a single quantifier meaning. But if there is a single quantifier meaning, our linguistic 
decisions do not determine the meaning of the quantifier expressions, and therefore, do 
not determine the truth-value of ontological existential assertions. Hence, ontological 
pluralism is false. Let me simply assume that these promiscuity arguments are sound 
and prove that ontological anti-realism is false and realism is true. 
 But these promiscuity arguments lead to a decadent ontology, or maximalism 
that is lightweight. Maximalism is the view that everything that can exist exists, that 
every ontological existential assertion that is possibly true is true. So the truth-value 
of ontological existential assertions will be trivial or shallow, which implies that they 
involve lightweight quantification. In this maximalism there is only a single 
lightweight quantifier with an absolutely unrestricted domain. I shall call it absolute 
maximalism to distinguish it from Eklund’s (2007) maximalism, which imposes some 
restrictions on his quantifier domain. According to Chalmers (ibid) participants in 
ontological disputes purport to express with ‘exist’ a single, primitive concept, 
absolute existential quantification. That is, he takes absolute existential quantification 
to be heavyweight, but doubts if there really is such a concept. I see it the other way 
round. The concept of absolute existential quantification is real, but lightweight. 
 Absolute maximalism however faces the potential problem of incompatible 
objects as Eklund (ibid: 382) calls it. As he says we might argue that there are two 
kinds of objects the Fs and the Gs, such that the Fs satisfy the maximalist condition 
for existence and so do the Gs (they are each possible), but it is logically impossible 
for the Fs and the Gs to coexist. It is not obvious how can objects be incompatible, 
but there is certainly a feel to it that an ontology which incorporates any possible 
ontology can easily turn out to be inconsistent. At any rate, I won’t argue for it now. 
I shall simply assume that the argument is sound and prove that absolute maximal-
ism is false. 
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 What now? We have an absolute lightweight quantifier with a domain of 
incompatible objects. It is at this point that serious ontology begins. The ontologist 
must restrict the lightweight quantifier to a subset. He may settle for minimal 
conditions, consistency for instance, aiming at the largest possible subset that is 
consistent. However his restricted quantifier is not lightweight anymore. For it is no 
longer trivial whether his restriction is enough. Empirical adequacy, theoretical utility, 
and the like are still further restrictions of this single existential quantifier. But to 
repeat restriction makes the quantifier heavy. It is never trivial that a given restriction 
is adequate, which explains why heavyweight quantification is never trivial. 
Basically, warring ontologists are imposing different restrictions on one and the same 
existential quantifier, so ontological disputes basically revolve around restrictions. 
And it is at this point that an argument similar to Sider’s naturalness argument might 
be used to prove that there is a most natural quantifier restriction which carves at the 
joints of reality. The ontologist who hits upon it will hit the ontological structure of 
the world. 
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